IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND THE REFORM OF INVESTMENT LAW

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  • Additional Information
    • Publication Information:
      Cambridge University Press
    • Publication Date:
      2018
    • Subject Terms:
    • Abstract:
      The tide is turning. Ferment is in the air. Reform or even transformation of foreign direct investment governance appears on the way. (1) Different proposals are advanced, different proposals trashed. [...]
      This Article applies the theory of comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the trade-offs associated with alternative mechanisms for resolving investment disputes. We assess the tradeoffs in light of the principle of accountability under the rule of law, which underpins the goals of fairness, efficiency, and peace that are attributed to investment law. The Article makes two recommendations: first, reforms should address complementarity between domestic and international institutions; second, institutional choices should respond to the different contexts that states face.
    • ISSN:
      0002-9300
    • Accession Number:
      10.1017/ajil.2018.70
    • Rights:
      Copyright 2018 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.
      COPYRIGHT 2018 Cambridge University Press
    • Accession Number:
      edsgcl.557612607
  • Citations
    • ABNT:
      PUIG, S.; SHAFFER, G. Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law. American Journal of International Law, [s. l.], n. 3, p. 361, 2018. Disponível em: . Acesso em: 17 nov. 2019.
    • AMA:
      Puig S, Shaffer G. Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law. American Journal of International Law. 2018;(3):361. doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.70.
    • APA:
      Puig, S., & Shaffer, G. (2018). Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law. American Journal of International Law, (3), 361. https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2018.70
    • Chicago/Turabian: Author-Date:
      Puig, Sergio, and Gregory Shaffer. 2018. “Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law.” American Journal of International Law. doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.70.
    • Harvard:
      Puig, S. and Shaffer, G. (2018) ‘Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law’, American Journal of International Law, p. 361. doi: 10.1017/ajil.2018.70.
    • Harvard: Australian:
      Puig, S & Shaffer, G 2018, ‘Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law’, American Journal of International Law, no. 3, p. 361, viewed 17 November 2019, .
    • MLA:
      Puig, Sergio, and Gregory Shaffer. “Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law.” American Journal of International Law, no. 3, 2018, p. 361. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.70.
    • Chicago/Turabian: Humanities:
      Puig, Sergio, and Gregory Shaffer. “Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law.” American Journal of International Law, 2018. doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.70.
    • Vancouver/ICMJE:
      Puig S, Shaffer G. Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law. American Journal of International Law [Internet]. 2018 [cited 2019 Nov 17];(3):361. Available from: http://widgets.ebscohost.com/prod/customlink/proxify/proxify.php?count=1&encode=0&proxy=&find_1=&replace_1=&target=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsgao&AN=edsgcl.557612607&authtype=sso&custid=s1007886